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Private Antitrust Litigation in the European
Union
TILL SCHREIBER*

Abstract
The private enforcement of antitrustdamage claims continues to be a top priority of the European Commission and national competition authorities. Considering the large scope of damages
resultingfrom the violation of E. U. competition law, it is likely that the number of antitrust
damage actions in the E. U. will continue to increase in the future. Although damage claims find
their legal basis in E.U law, they have to be enforced on the national level. Against this background, this article explains the key factorsfor the future development of private enforcement in
the European Union (E.U.) and analyzes the measures andpolicy choicesproposedby the European
Commission in its White Paper, as well as relevant developments at Member State level. Finally,
the article sets out practicalsolutions on how to overcome the still existing obstacles to private
enforcement in the E.U.
I.

Introduction

When the "Ashurst Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules" was published in August 2004, it concluded that
the state of private enforcement of competition law in the E.U. was characterized by "total
underdevelopment" and an "astonishing diversity" in the approaches taken by different
Member States.' As a reaction to this gloomy picture for the prospects of private enforcement in the E.U., the European Commission published a White Paper on Damages ac* Dr. Till Schreiber is Legal Counsel and heads the Brussels office of CDC Cartel Damage Claims. He
studied law at the universities of Bonn, Cologne, Barcelona, and London (University College) and published
a doctoral thesis on international competition law. Before joining CDC, Till Schreiber has worked as
attorney for six years in the antitrust and competition group of a leading international law firm in Brussels,
Cologne, and Madrid. Since joining CDC in 2007, Dr Schreiber has been active in the preparation and
management of several damage cases relating to pan-European antitrust infringements. He has spoken at
numerous conferences and has published articles on the innovative business model of CDC as well as general
developments in the field of private enforcement in Europe. Till Schreiber speaks German, English, Spanish,
French, and Dutch. The views and opinions expressed in this article are strictly personal.
1. Emily Clark et al., Study on the Conditions of Claimsfor Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition
Rules, Ashurst, (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrustactionsdamages/
comparative..report clean en.pdf.
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tions for breach of EC antitrust rules on April 2, 2008.2 Together with its White Paper,
3
the Commission published a detailed Staff Working Paper, which provides the legal
4
an economic analywhich
contains
Report,
Assessment
Impact
as
an
as
well
background,
sis of different potential private enforcement scenarios. In addition, an extensive eco5
nomic study on the welfare impact of more effective private damage actions and, on
6
January 19, 2010, an economic study on the quantification of antitrust damages were
published on the Commission's website.
This activity by the Commission clearly indicates that the legal and economic landscape
of actions for damages resulting from the violation of E.U. antitrust law is currently
changing to the benefit of victims of antitrust infringements. In addition to the activity at
European level, national legislators have introduced important legislative changes at national level in order to facilitate the private enforcement of antitrust damage claims. In
Germany for example, the legislator amended the German Act against Restraints of Com7
petition (ARC) in 2005 with the aim to strengthen private antitrust enforcement.
This article aims to provide an overview and contribute to the ongoing discussion in
Europe from a practitioner's point of view. The first part sets out some key factors for the
future development of private enforcement in the E.U. (Part A). The second part analyzes
some specific measures and policy choices proposed by the Commission in its White Paper and/or national legislators (Part B). The third part explains the still existing obstacles
to private damage claims in the E.U. and the practical approach of the company Cartel
Damage Claims ("CDC") to overcome these obstacles (Part C).

H.

Key Factors for the Development of Private Enforcement in the E.U.

Over the last years, a number of key factors for the development of private enforcement
have emerged from the case law of the Court of Justice of the E.U. ("CJ"), but also from
the Commission's White Paper and the accompanying documents. These elements are
part of the acquis communautaire and are thus already today directly applicable in damage
actions before national courts. They will have a positive impact on the development of a
2. White Paperon DamagesActions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, COMM'N ON THE EuRoPEAN CoMMUNrnEs, (Apr. 2, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/whitepapersen.pdf.
3. Commission Staff Working PaperAccompanying the White Paperon Damages Actions for Breach of the EC
Antitrust Rules, CoMM'N ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNMES, (Apr. 2, 2008), http-//ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/working-paper.pdf (hereinafter Commission Staff Working
Paper].
4. Commission Staff Working Document-Accompanying Document to the White Paper on Damages Actions for
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rides. Impact Assessment, COMM'N ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTEs, (Apr. 2,
2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files-white-paper/impact-report.pdf [hereinafter Impact Assessment].
5. Centre for European Policy Studies, et al., Making Antitrust DamagesActions More Effective in the EU:
Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios, Final Report, COM (2006) AS/012 final (Mar. 30, 2008), available at
httpJ/ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/fileswhite-paper/impact._study.pdf.
6. Quantifying Antitrust Damages, Towards Non-Binding Guidancefor Courts, OXERA, (Dec. 2009), http-//
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification-study.pdf.
7. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrlinkungen [German Act Against Restraints of Competition], July 15,
2005, BGBL. I at 2114 (F.R.G.).
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more effective system of private enforcement in the E.U., independently of whether the
proposals set out in the Commission's White Paper will be adopted or not.
A.

THE

EcoNomic IMPACT OF THE OVERALL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM

ANTITRUST INFRINGEMENTS IN THE

E.U.

The question of whether or not to launch a damage action is mainly driven by an economic evaluation of the costs, risks, and potential outcome implied in such action. The
success of private enforcement will therefore ultimately depend on whether market participants consider antitrust damage claims as potentially valuable assets. The overall still
limited number of antitrust damage actions in the E.U. shows that this is currently not yet
the case. The Impact Assessment Report of the Commission, however, clearly indicates
that the size of damages caused by infringements of competition law in the E.U., and thus
the damage claims that victims currently forego, does not justify such a reserved approach.
The Impact Assessment Report estimates that the total amount of compensation (single
damages plus pre-judgment interest) that victims of anticompetitive infringements are
currently foregoing amounts to approximately C5.7 billion to C23.3 billion each year
across the E.U. 8 According to the recent "Oxera Study on the Quantification of Antitrust
Damages," the average price overcharge caused by hardcore cartels in Europe amounts to
between ten percent and twenty percent of the competitive price of the given product or
service and the median overcharge amounts to eighteen percent.9
Given these impressive figures it seems likely that victims of anticompetitive conducts
will in the future more often decide to pursue their potential damage claims. This is
particularly true for larger, possibly listed companies, which are bound by corporate law
and corporate governance obligations to pursue damage claims in order to safeguard the
companys' and the shareholders' interests.' 0
B.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR DAMAGE

CLAIMS is ROOTED

IN

E.U.

LAW

According to the case law of the CJ, the right of victims to damages is directly conferred
by Community law. In the groundbreaking judgment Courage v. Crehan, the CJ laid down
that "the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 85 (1) EC (now, Art. 101
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU")) would be put at risk
if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract

or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition."" In Manfredi, the CJ further
clarified the right of victims of infringements of E.U. competition rules to claim damages:
"It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there
is a causal relationship between the harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under
8. See Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 15.
9. See QuantifyingAntitrust Damages, Towards Non-Binding Guidancefor Courts, supra note 6, at 90.
10. See, e.g., Dr. Alexander Franz & David A. Jiintgen, Die Pflicht von Managern zur Geltendmachung von

Schadensersatzanspriichen aus Kartellverstipen [The Obligation of Managers to Claim Damages Resulting
From Antitrust Infringements), 32 BErRIEBs-BERATER 1681, 1681-87 (2007) (regarding the corporate law
obligation of managers under German law to pursue damage claims for the infringement of national and EC
competition law).
11. Case C-453/99, Courage v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6297.
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Article 81 EC (now, Art. 101 TFEU)."12 Neither the CJ, nor the Commission have,
however, yet clarified whether the right to claim damages is directly enshrined in Articles
101 and 102 TFEU or in the general legal principles of Community law. A comparison
with the case law of the CJ concerning the liability of the Member States to individuals for
a breach of E.U. Law implies that the latter is more likely to be the case. 13 From a practical point of view this does not, however, make any difference as it is clear from the foregoing that E.U. Law provides for the legal base on which any victim of an infringement of
E.U. antitrust rules may directly claim damages before a competent national court if the
following three conditions are fulfilled: (i) there is an infringement of Article 101 or 102
TFEU, (ii) the individual has suffered a damage, and (iii) there is a causal relationship
between the damage suffered and the infringement.
C. NATIONAL LAW HAS TO BE

INTERPRETED

IN LINE WITH THE

E.U.

LAW

PRINCIPLES OF EQUIVALENCE AND EFFEcTIvENEss

Although damage claims for the violation of E.U. competition rules law are rooted in
E.U. Law, in practice they have to be enforced before national courts in accordance with
the procedural and substantive law provisions applicable in the respective Member State.
However, due to the direct effect and the supremacy of European Law, the applicable
national provisions are subject to two legal principles of significant practical importance:
(i) the principle of equivalence and (ii) the principle of effectiveness. In Manfredi, the CJ
held that:
in the absence of Community rules, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed material and procedural rules governing actions for
safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from Community law, provided
that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions
(principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of
effectiveness).14
In particular, the principle of effectiveness may require national judges to adopt a lenient interpretation or set aside national provisions in order to enable victims to effectively
enforce their right to damages conferred by E.U. Law, even if this would a priori not be in
line with the wording of the provision or established domestic case law. For example, this
may be the case when overly severe limitation periods in national law do not take account
of the specific circumstances of the often clandestine infringements of E.U. antitrust
rules.Is
12. Joined Cases C-295/04 & C-298/04, Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I6619.
13. According to the CJ in Francovicb, "[t]he full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and
the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress
when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible." See Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich, Bonifaci v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-05357.
14. Manfredi, 2006 E.C.R., para. 62, 72, 81.
15. According to the CJ "it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to prescribe the limitation period for seeking compensation for harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited under Article
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COMPENSATION OF DAMAGES

Damage claims represent an economic value and are therefore protected by the right of
property enshrined in the fundamental principles of E.U. law as set out in Art. 17 (1) of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the E.U.16 In accordance with the case law of the
CJ, the Commission therefore established the principle of full compensation as the fore7
most guiding principle in the context of damage claims for antitrust infringements.1 According to the CJ, the damage to be compensated under E.U. law encompasses three
8
factors: (i) the actual loss, (ii) loss of profit, and (iii) the right to interest.' The European
approach thus significantly differs from the United States, where private damage actions
9
are fundamentally designed to deter future infringements.' In practice, the differences in
the approach may, however, be less important than one presumes at the outset that:
Given the long average duration of cartels in the E.U. combined with the right to claim
interest as of the first day of infringement, damages easily amount to twice the actual
damage so that any "gap" with the U.S. approach is in reality much smaller than
perceived. 20
E.

JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW

Any violation of E.U. antitrust law by definition affects the market in more than one
Member State. This raises complex questions in relation to jurisdiction and the applicable
procedural and substantive law.
1. Jurisdiction
The international jurisdiction of courts in the E.U. is essentially governed by Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 ("Brussels I Regulation"). 21 The general rule under Article 2(1)
Brussels I Regulation is that any person has to be sued before the court at the defendant's
domicile or seat. However, in the context of tortuous liability and collective litigation, the
Regulation contains specific heads of jurisdiction. Given the tortuous character of antitrust infringements, these specific jurisdictional rules are particularly relevant for antitrust
damage actions. With regard to tortuous liability, Article 5(3) Brussels I Regulation
designates as competent the "courts for the place where the harmful event occurred" (forum delicti). 22 According to the case law of the CJ, this place can, in general, either be the
81 EC, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed." Manfredi, 2006 E.C.R.,
para. 81.
16. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ. (C 364) 1. This Charter became
binding as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community. Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
17. See Comminission Staff Working Paper, supra note 3, at 3.

18. Manfredi, 2006 E.C.R., pars. 95.
19. One example for the importance of deterrence in U.S. antitrust law is the automatic trebling of damages, which is nonexistent in the E.U.
20. Manfredi, 2006 E.C.R., para. 97. In Germany, Section 33 (3) ARC specifically clarifies that interests
start to be calculated from the date on which the damage occurred. German Act Against Restraints of Competition-Seventh Amendment, July 1, 2005, BGBL. I at 19 (F.R.G.).
21. Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 OJ. (L 12) 44 (E.U.).
22. Id. art. 5(3).
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23
place of the event giving rise to the damage or the place where the damage occurred.
Accordingly, jurisdiction was established at the seat of a victim of the Vitamins cartel in
Germany in relation to an antitrust damage action against a cartel member seated in
Switzerland. 24
Further, the regulation establishes a specific jurisdiction for collective litigation that is
also suited for antitrust damage actions against two or more infringers having their seat in
different Member States. Pursuant to Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation, several co-defendants can be sued at the domicile or seat of one co-defendant (so called "anchor defendant"), provided the "claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and
determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings." 25 Such a factual and legal connection is typically established in cases
concerning the enforcement of antitrust damage claims: (i) such claims result from the
same anticompetitive conduct (e.g. price-fixing, allocation of markets) and (ii) the infringers are jointly and severally liable for the overall damage caused by their illicit activities.
This provision therefore designates alternative, equally competent courts at the seat of
each of the infringers. According to English case law, actions against a multitude of infingers can also be lodged on the basis of Art. 6 (1) Brussels I Regulation before the
competent court at the seat of subsidiaries of the infringers (i.e. subsidiaries acting as
26
anchor defendants), at least if the subsidiaries implemented the cartel agreements.

2. Applicable law
I The court competent to hear and to adjudicate the case will as a general rule apply the
procedural rules of the Member State in question (lex fori). In addition, it has to determine which substantive law will apply to claims for damages resulting from the violation
of E.U. antitrust law. In this respect, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable
27
on extra-contractual obligations ("Rome II Regulation") is relevant. The Rome II Regulation harmonized the private international law rules of the Member States concerning
tortuous liability and entered into force on January 11, 2009. Article 6(3) provides for a
special rule on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of antitrust
infringements, covering violations of both European and national competition law. According to Article 6(3) lit. a Rome II Regulation, the law applicable on claims resulting
from the violation of competition law "shall be the law of the country where the market is,
or is likely to be, affected." 28 However, pursuant to Article 6(3) lit. b Rome II Regulation
in cases where "the market is, or is likely to be, affected in more than one country . .. [the
claimant] may instead choose to base his or her claim on the law of the court seized,
provided that the market in that Member State is amongst those directly and significantly
affected by the restriction of competition." 29 It results that following the choice of the
23. Case C-21/76, Handelsk wekerig GJ. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735.
24. This decision concerned the corresponding provision of Article 5(3) Lugano Convention. Landgericht
Dortmund Case 13 0 55/02, Landgericht [LGI [District Court], Apr. 1, 2004, IPRax 2005 (542) (F.R.G.).

25. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 6(1), 2000 0J. (L 12) 44 (E.U.).
26. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Europe Ltd. & Ors v. Dow Deutschland Inc. & Ors [2010] EWCA (Civ)
864, 2010; Provimi Ltd./Roche Products Ltd. [2003] EWHC (Comm) 961.
27. Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 41 (EC).
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id.
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claimant, claims for damages sustained in different Member States will be adjudicated
under application of one single law. In relation to antitrust infringements that took place
prior to the entry into force of Article 6(3) Rome II Regulation, there are good arguments
that in particular cases where the main infringement (e.g. the kick-off meeting of a cartel)
took place in one Member State, the substantive law of that Member State is applicable to
all damage claims, even if the economic effect (also) occurred in other Member States. In
particular, the principle of effectiveness established by the CJ and mirrored in Article 6(3)
lit. b Rome II Regulation implies the application of one coherent and set of procedural
and substantive law to damage claims based on an infringement of E.U. antitrust law.
I1I. Specific Measures Proposed in the European Commission's White
Paper
In its White Paper the Commission has identified nine areas that require legislative
30
action in order to overcome the current ineffectiveness of antitrust damage actions. For
each of these areas the Commission proposes specific measures and policy choices. Furthermore, the Commission set out the aquis communautaire that clarifies for each of the
nine areas the rights conferred by E.U. Law on which victims of antitrust infringements
can rely before national courts. This provides a significant improvement for potential
claimants, in particular as it is still unclear whether the Commission will take the next step
in the legislative process and submit a formal draft directive. But, already the proposals in
the White Paper are overall not sufficient and are partly even detrimental to attain the
objective of providing a framework for an effective enforcement of antitrust damage
claims. In this respect the proposals in the White Paper relating to following areas merit a
closer comment: (1) indirect purchasers and collective redress, (2) access to evidence and
disclosure inter partes, and (3) the passing-on defense.
A.

INDIRECT PURCHASERS AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS

The Commission rightly acknowledges the general standing of indirect purchasers to
bring damage claims. In Courage and Crehan, the CJ clearly stated that "the practical
effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC would be put at risk if it were not
open to any individualto claim damages for loss caused to him. . . ."31 But, in the event of
small damage claims, typically on the end-consumer level, it is unlikely that the victims
will actually make use of their right to claim damages on an individual level. For most
end-consumers it is simply not worth going through the hassle and bearing the costs of
32
legal proceedings, if the potential damage to be awarded is not substantial. The Commission wants to overcome this fundamental dilemma by combining collective redress
30. These areas are: (i) standing: indirect purchasers and collective redress, (ii) access to evidence: inter
partes disclosure, (iii) binding effect of decisions adopted by competition authorities, (iv) fault requirements,
(v) damages, (vi) the passing-on of overcharges, (vii) limitation periods, (viii) costs of damage actions, and (ix)
interaction between leniency programmes and actions for damages. See Commission Staff Working Paper,supra
note 3.
31. Courage, 2001 E.C.R., at para. 26.
32. According to a survey, more than fifty percent of European consumers stated they will not go to court
to seek redress for claims of less than C200. Katy Dowell, Proposalfor EU-Wide Class Action Finds No Favour
With UK Practitioners,LAw. (Eng.), Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgiid=136067.
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mechanisms with a general presumption that-in case the action is lodged by end-consumers or their representatives-cartel-related price overcharges are entirely passed on to
the end-consumer level.33 However, the strong focus on and the favorable treatment of
end-consumers implies a number of practical problems, which would not foster but hinder
the development of an effective private enforcement system and full compensation of
victims:
*

Low incentive to start damage actions: As a result of the cost- and time-intenseness of

antitrust damage actions and the low average damage amount, the economic incentive
to start damage actions at end-consumer level will be limited, despite the availability of
collective redress. This is confirmed by experiences in jurisdictions that already provide for representative or opt-in collective redress at end-consumer level, such as the
United Kingdom or Germany. In the U.K. for example, the consumer organization
Which? was granted the right to bring collective actions against infringers of U.K.
competition law in 2005.34 It was not until 2007 that Which? brought its first collective action against the sports retailer JJB Sports for price fixing of football replica
shirts. 35 Despite a large media campaign and significant internal and financial efforts,
36
Which? was only able to name 500 individuals in its representative action. The total
damage enforced at the end of the proceedings amounted to around 218,000, resulting
in an individual payout of 220.37 The legal head of Which? concluded that the low
value of the payout, combined with the hassle to provide court, prove evidence makes
38
it very unlikely that the consumer organization would bring another action soon. In
Germany, where associations and consumer organizations are allowed to recover illegal gains from the infringers of E.U. and domestic competition law, no such proceed39
ing has ever been initiated.
* Lack of court proofevidence: Any action for damages will only be successful if the claimant(s) can substantiate and evidence (i) the damage suffered and (ii) the causal link
between the infringement and the damage. 40 In the E.U., the burden of proof generally lies with the claimant and typically requires evidence on price overcharges relating
4
to the purchase of the product or service subject to the anticompetitive conduct. 1
But, end-consumers do not typically retain such evidence (e.g. purchase invoices), at
least not for a long period of time. 42 In view of the often long-lasting competition law
infringements, this situation results in a lack of court-proof evidence at the end-con33. For details on the passing-on of overcharges see section B.3 infra. Commission Staff Working Paper,
supra note 3.
34. Our Legal Powers, WHIcH? WoRKs FOR You, http://www.which.co.uk/about-which/what-we-do/campaign-with-you/our-legal-powers/ (last visited Jan. 2011).
35. Id.
36. Caroline Binham, JfB to pay out after football shirts claim, LAw. (Eng.), Jan. 9, 2008, http-//
www.thelawyer.com/jjb-to-pay-out-after-football-shirts-claim/1 30660.article.
37. Id.
38. Katy Dowell, Class Action Ir One Big Headache, Says Wich?, LAw. (Eng.), Dec. 1, 2008, http://
35901.article.
www.thelawyer.com/class-action-is-one-big-headache-says-which?/
39. German Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 15, 2005, BGBL. I at 2114, § 34a.
40. Comments on the European Commiion's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules,
CDC CARTEL DAMAGE CLAIMS, at 4 ouly 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/
white-paper.comments/cdc-en.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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sumer level and thus a perpetuation of the unjust enrichment of the infringers, in
particular in long-lasting hardcore cartels. This is confirmed by the above-mentioned
experience of U.K. consumer organization Which? in the football replica shirt case.
The potential availability of disclosure inter partesdoes not remedy this situation. Due
to the existence of one or more market levels between the infringer and the endconsumer, the infringer is typically not in a position to provide the court-proof documentation and information required to evidence the damage and the causal link with
the infringement at end-consumer level.4 3
As a result of these practical limitations and based on the principle of effectiveness established by the CJ, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe in Germany has recently
generally excluded the standing of indirect purchasers in antitrust damage actions.44 This
German court has therefore reached a conclusion comparable to the "Illinois Brick" doctrine in the United States, according to which damage claims by indirect purchasers are
generally excluded at federal level.45 Whether this far-reaching conclusion will be upheld,
however, remains to be seen.
B.

ACCESS TO EVIDENCE: DISCLOSURE INTER PARTES

One of the key requirements to ensure the effectiveness of antitrust damage actions is
the access of victims to relevant evidence held by the defendants or third parties. In order
to overcome the currently asymmetric availability of evidence, the Commission proposes a
minimum level of inter partes disclosure, based on fact pleading combined with judicial
control of relevance and proportionality. 46
1.

Discovery before national courts

According to the CJ in LaboratoiresBoiron, national courts are already today required to
use all procedures available under national law, including that of ordering the production
of a particular document by one of the parties or a third party, in order to comply with the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness.4 7 Jurisdictions that provide for broad discovery rules under national law may therefore be an interesting forum for bringing antitrust
damage actions. However, should the passing-on defense be recognized in the jurisdiction
of choice, both claimants and defendants can equally rely on disclosure rules. From a
claimant's perspective, discovery may therefore even have a negative effect as the use of
discovery by the defendants may not only significantly prolong and complicate an already
complex litigation, but can also result in a situation where defendants find proof that the
43. Id.
44. Oberlandesgericht {OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe June 11, 2010, RECHTSPRECHUNG DER
OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN [OLGZ] 6 U 118/05 (F.R.G.).

45. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
46. Impact Assessment, supra note 4, at 5. For a detailed explanation of the Commission proposal of inter
partes disclosure, see Commission Staff Working Paper,supra note 3, at 30-31. The details of the right to inter-

pares disclosure is based on the approach developed by the Commission under Directive 2004/48/EC (IP
Directive). Council Directive 2004/48/EC 2004 O.J. (L195/16).
47. Case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron SA v. Union, 2006 E.C.R. 1-07529. The Conunission echoes this
ruling in the acquis communautaire relating to disclosure rights. See Commission Staff Working Paper,supra note

3.
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damage was de facto totally or partly passed on to subsequent market levels, making the
damage action totally or partially unfounded.
On the other hand, the direct effect of E.U. Law requires that domestic rules relating to
the access to evidence that make the exercise of the right to compensation excessively
difficult must not be applied to cases of damages for the infringement of E.U. competition
rules. 48
2. Detailedfining decisions by the Commission and access to the file
The General Court of the E.U. specifically recognized the necessity "of persons harmed
by the infringement [ofJ being informed of the details thereof so that they may, where
appropriate, assert their rights against the undertakings punished." 49 Only detailed decisions setting out the precise facts of antitrust infringements will therefore allow victims to
effectively assess the harm suffered. Under its current practice, the Commission does,
however, exclude all substantial facts provided in the context of a leniency statement from
its publicly available decision. This practice seems difficult to reconcile with the requirement of a high degree of transparency established by the European Courts. The requirement of a detailed and substantiated description of the infringement should also be taken
into account by the Commission in the context of its new settlement procedure for cartels.50 The Commission is right to state that the protection of confidential information
may not defacto preclude the exercise of the right to compensation. 5' For the avoidance of
discrepancies between the various E.U. jurisdictions, it would therefore be advantageous
to introduce a uniform and clear definition of the information that can legitimately be
regarded as "confidential."
With regard to evidence contained in the Commission's case file, the Commission, as
any other European institution, is under an obligation of sincere cooperation with the
judicial authorities of the Member States. According to the CJ in Zwarveld, the Commnission is therefore-within certain limits-obliged to produce relevant documents or authorize its officials to be examined as witnesses before national court proceedings
concerning the infringement of E.U. competition law.52 In addition, Regulation 1049/
2001 grants a right of access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission documents to any E.U. citizen and to any natural or legal person residing, or having its registered office, in a Member State.53 The European Parliament is therefore right to require
that victims of antitrust infringements be allowed access to relevant documents in the
Commission's files, unless interests pressingly in need of protection are endangered in the
process.54
48. See Commision Staff Working Paper, supra note 3, at 26.
49. Case T-198/03, Bank Austria Creditanstalt v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. I-01429, para. 78.
50. See Commiion Notice on the Conduct of Settlement Proceduresin View of the Adoption of Decisions Pursuant to
Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation, 2008 OJ. (C 167) 1.
51. Commision Staff Working Paper,supra note 3, at 35.
52. Case C-2/88, Zwartveld, 1990 E.C.R. 1-04405, paras. 25-26.
53. Commission Regulation 1049/2001, Public Access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission
Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43.
54. European ParliamentResolution on the White Paperon DamagesActions for Breach of the ECAntitrust Rules,
EUR. PAlu.. Doc. T6-0187/2009 (2009), available at http-//www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub
Ref=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2009-0187+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN.
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PASSING-ON DEFENSE

According to economic theory and depending on a number of economic conditions,
direct purchasers may "pass on" part or all of the illegal price overcharge to the next
(indirect) purchaser in the chain, e.g. a retailer or end-consumer. In legal terms, the possibility of defendants in antitrust cases to invoke the alleged passing-on by the claimant in
order to limit the liability for compensation is referred to as "passing-on defense."ss From
an economic point of view, the passing-on defense is not a viable means to improve the
effectiveness of antitrust damage actions, as the incentive for such actions is essentially
driven by the aim of direct purchasers to recover significant damage amounts. This economic presumption led to the adoption of the "Illinois Brick" doctrine in the United
States.5 6 The principle of an effective and full recoupment of damages as postulated by
the CJ implies that the application of the passing-on defense should be the exception and
not the rule. It should be limited to concrete cases in which passing-on is likely to have
occurred: for example market structures characterized by vertically integrated companies
or industries which typically price on a "cost plus" basis. 57 It also seems necessary to avoid
situations where by relying on the passing-on defense, infringers could effectively block
the enforcement of legitimate damage claims.
At the national level, there are significant differences with respect to recognition of the
passing-on defense in antitrust damage cases. In the U.K. for example, the Lords Justices
of Appeal in Devenish Nutrition stated that damages should only be available for losses
actually suffered, suggesting that the passing-on defense is likely to apply in antitrust damage cases.58 In Germany on the other hand, the German ARC explicitly clarifies that the
resale of a cartelized good or service does not in itself preclude the existence of a damage
of direct purchasers, and thus their standing, in a court procedure.59 Based on this provision and the general civil law principles on the balance of advantages ("Vorteilsausgkich"),
German courts held that the passing-on defense is generally excluded in the context of
antitrust damage claims.60 Besides the principle of effectiveness established by the CJ the
courts based their argumentation on the fact that there is no causal link between the infringement and the (alleged) passing-on of the damage and that infringers should not
benefit from the successful and economically justified efforts of direct purchasers, selling
61
their products or services to the next market level at the highest price possible.
IV. Existing Obstacles to Private Enforcement and the Approach of CDC
to Overcome These Obstacles
Despite recent legislative changes, victims of antitrust infringements still face significant
obstacles when it comes to the enforcement of damage claims. The obstacles include (1)
55. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 452 (8th ed. 2004).
56. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720.
57. See European ParliamentResolution on the White Paperon DamagesActions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules, supra note 54.
58. Devinish Nutrition Ltd. v. Sanofi-Aventis, S.A., [20071 EWHC 2394; see also Emerald Supplies, [2010]

A.C. 1284.
59. German Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 15, 2005, BGBL. I at 2114, § 33(3).
60. Kammergericht [KG] Berlin, Oct. 1, 2009, OLGZ 2 U 10/03 (F.R.G.); OLG, supra note 44.
61. Id.
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the calculation and evidence of damages, (2) the economic risks involved, and (3) the unclear legal situation in many E.U. Member States, including the lack of collective redress
mechanisms. Against this background the company Cartel Damage Claims ("CDC") has
developed solutions to practically overcome these obstacles.
A.

CALCULATION AND EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES

Under the procedural law of virtually all E.U. Member States a claimant has to sufficiently demonstrate and prove the damage suffered as a result of a tortuous act. In order
to comply with the burden of proof, a claimant in an antitrust damage action thus has to
submit court-proof evidence in respect of the damage suffered and the causality between
the infringement and the damage. In the field of antitrust law it is, however, often extremely difficult for a single victim to calculate and to evidence the damage, as marketwide effects have to be assessed. The key challenge is the determination of the "hypothetical competitive price" of the product or service in question. It is at least the difference
between such hypothetical competitive price and the price effectively paid by the victim,
multiplied by the unit volumes purchased in the cartel period, which results in the total
damage sustained. In view of its hypothetical character it is widely accepted that the com62
petitive price, and thus the individual damage, may finally be estimated by the court.
The German ARC contains a specific provision in this respect, which significantly reduces
the burden of proof.63 However, the claimant still has to provide full evidence of the
complex factual and economic background (e.g. purchase and market data) on the basis of
which the court can proceed to its estimation. The required data basis must in particular
be sufficiently representative in order to serve as a sound basis for the estimation of the
hypothetical market price. 64 The economic models available to analyze cartel-related
damages do not lighten the burden of proof of the claimant as any such analysis ideally
presupposes the existence of sufficiently detailed data on the actual price development in
65
the markets concerned.
B.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS

Furthermore, the enforcement of antitrust damage claims may involve significant economic and financial risks. The preparation of claims for damages resulting from the violation of E.U. Competition Law is cost and time intensive. In addition to the collection and
62. According to the Commission, the principle of effectiveness excludes a national court that found that
the claimant was harmed by the defendant's infringement of the competition rules, from not awarding any
damages simply because the claimant cannot prove sufficiently precisely the amount of the harm suffered.
Commission Staff Working Paper,supra note 3, at 60. The Commission intends to issue non-binding guidance
on the calculation of damages in 2011. As part of such guidance, the Commission will consider suggesting
simplified rules for estimating the loss suffered as a result of a competition law infringement. See id. at 61.
63. German Act Against Restraints of Competition, July 15, 2005, BGBL. I at 2114, § 33(3).
64. In practice, particularly detailed purchase data from a multitude of victims allow the claimant to track
and to analyze the real price development over years in the market concerned. Such precise data are quite
difficult to obtain by the single victim, independent of the possibilities to additionally enforce claims for
access to information against the infringers, or claims of access to file against the Commission or national
competition authorities.
65. See Quantifying Antitrust Damages: Towards Nan-BindingGuidancefor Courts, OXElm, (Dec. 2009), http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification-study.pdf.
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analysis of relevant evidence and purchase data, the preparation of antitrust damage actions generally requires support from external legal and economic experts. Depending on
the jurisdiction where an action for damages is brought, the filing of damage actions may
require the payment of considerable up-front court fees. The financial risk of claimants in
antitrust damage cases may further increase as a result of the often long duration of legal
proceedings. Finally, corporate victims of antitrust infringements may want to refrain
from legal actions due to ongoing commercial relationships with their suppliers.
C.

LACK OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND LACK OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS

Finally, antitrust damage claims in the E.U. are still in their infancy. Most Member
States lack a clear legal framework in respect of damage actions for violation of E.U.
competition law. This effectively prevents many victims from enforcing their claims. Although the CJ has formulated key principles, it is essentially for the Member States with
their "procedural autonomy" to provide for the material and procedural rules governing
such actions.66 The legal reforms undertaken so far on a national level are, however, still
fragmentary across the E.U. Given that legal certainty and predictability are in most cases
decisive for bringing a damage action, it is evident that currently many victims of antitrust
infringements are still rather deterred from pursuing their claims.
One fundamental aspect in the relative lack of private enforcement activity in the E.U.
is the absence of collective redress mechanisms, in particular for direct purchasers. Effective forms of collective redress would in practice allow the victims to overcome the existing obstacles for bringing antitrust damage actions, as they would allow for the sharing
of costs and risks inherent in such claims. While some Member States have introduced in
recent years procedures of collective redress, (e.g. Portugal, Sweden, and Italy67), they are
typically designed for end-consumer claims, i.e. cases with widely dispersed and individually low value claims. But such procedures have in most Member States not yet been
applied in the context of competition law infringements. In England, the Court of Appeal
in Emerald Supplies explicitly held that the claimants in an antitrust damage action did not
have standing to represent other direct and indirect purchasers under the representative
68
action provision in the Civil Procedural Rules.
D.

THE

APPROACH OF

CDC

TO OVERCOME EXISTING OBSTACLES

With a view to practically address the obstacles to the effective enforcement of antitrust
damage claims in the E.U., CDC was founded in 2002.69 CDC is specialized in the
purchase, the preparation, and the enforcement of such claims to CDC. The collective
approach of CDC not only results in significant synergies, but also considerably strength70
ens the position of the victims in potential out-of-court/settlement discussions.
66. See Courage, 2001 E.C.R.; Manfredi, 2006 E.C.R.
67. See Member State Fiches on Consumer Redress, E.U., Jan. 2011, http://ec.europa.edu/consumers/redresscons/adr en.htm#MSfiches.
68. Emerald Supplies, [20101 A.C. 1284.
69. About CDC, CARTEL DAMAGE CLAiws, http-/www.carteldamageclaims.con/About%20CDC.shtmi
(last visited Jan. 2011).
70. Commission Staff Working Paper,supra note 3, at 16.
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1. Purchase of antitrust damage claims
Without being limited to this approach, CDC bundles damage claims on a material law
level. In this respect CDC purchases the damage claims from a multitude of companies
damaged by a given antitrust infringement.7 1 The victims transfer their damage claims by
way of assignment. 72 After the preparation of the factual and economic background, CDC
enforces the damage claims in its own name and on its own account in and out-of court."
74
The enforcement encompasses the evaluation of settlement opportunities and litigation.
75
an
create
aims
to
CDC
this
way
In
lawyers.
external
In court, CDC is represented by
incentive for victims of antitrust infringements to start the enforcement of damage claims.
In the absence of collective redress mechanisms, the bundling of claims is a trigger for
antitrust damage actions, in particular as ongoing business relations are not affected by the
enforcement process. In addition, the bundling of antitrust damage claims balances out
the structural disadvantage of single victims vis-k-vis the infringers. Finally, given the
often significant amount of such damages, the CDC approach of bundling antitrust claims
across entire purchaser groups increases the possibilities to reach settlements and to attract third-party funding.
2. Centralized collection and analysis of relevant data on a market-wide level
In addition to the bundling of claims, CDC centrally collects and analyzes representa76
tive purchase data (i.e. data on cartel-affected purchases), as well as relevant market data.
The collection and analysis of large volumes of purchase data from a multitude of cartel
victims allows CDC to precisely mirror the price developments prior, during, and after
the infringement period. The collection and analysis of such representative data allows
for well-founded conclusions on the market-wide effects of an infringement and the competitive "but-for" price. Therefore, CDC is in the position to precisely demonstrate and
evidence the damage that each victim individually has sustained as a result of an
infringement.
3. Business model confirmed by Federal Court of Justice
In 2003, the German competition authority found that numerous cement producers had
shared the German cement market, agreed on sales quotas and fixed prices since the early
1990s. 77 Subsequently, CDC purchased the cartel-related damage claims of thirty-six cement-consuning companies and analyzed the cartel-related damage. CDC brought an
71. About CDC, supra note 69.
72. Approach, CARTEL DAMAGE CLAIS,
ited Jan. 2011).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.

http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/Approach.shtml

(last vis-

77. By decision in April 2003, the Bundeskartellamt fined the six largest companies a record fine of C660
million. One company had exposed the cartel and had applied for the German Leniency Program. See Press
Release, the Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt imposes fines totalling 660 million Euro on companies in
the cement sector on account of cartel agreements (of Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/News/Archiv/ArchivNews2003/2003_04,_14.php.
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action for damages against six cartel members in August 2005 before the Regional Court
of Diisseldorf.78 The Court by interim judgement on February 21, 2007, declared the
damage action admissible.79 Subsequently, both the Higher Regional Court of Diisseldorf
and in April 2009 the German Federal Court ofJustice confirmed this judgment.80 In the
meantime, CDC has lodged a damage action before the Regional Court in Dortmund
(Germany) against the members of the pan-European Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel, in
which it bundled the damage claims purchased from thirty-two companies of the pulp and
8
paper industry. '

Leniency PLUS* concept

4.

In the E.U., most cartel decisions by the European Commission or national competition authorities are the result of the cooperation by cartel members under public leniency
programs. While avoiding administrative fines, leniency applicants are nevertheless exposed to private damage actions. This is in particular the case in Europe, as all cartel
members (including leniency applicants) are jointly and severally liable for the entire damage caused. Against this background, CDC has developed its Leniency PLUS* concept,
which provides effective solutions by creating incentives for cartel members to cooperate
in the context of private damage claims.82 Under the concept cartel members have the
possibility to minimize their risk exposure to private damage claims by providing evidence
83
on the infringement and the damage caused by the infringement. Besides making priits Leniency PLUS*
that
confident
CDC
is
effective,
E.U.
more
in
the
vate enforcement
concept also contributes to a better reconciliation of public leniency programs and private
damage claims.
V.

Conclusion

In view of the large scope of damages resulting from the violation of E.U. competition
law, it is likely that the number of antitrust damage actions in the E.U. will continue to
increase in the future. Although damage claims find their legal basis in E.U. law, they
have to be enforced on the national level. In such cases the courts have, in the absence of
European rules, to apply the material and procedural rules of national law, provided they
do respect the E.U. principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The White Paper of the
Commission and its accompanying documents will play an important role for the development of private enforcement of competition law, independently of whether there will be a
E.U. Directive on this subject matter or not. In particular, the proposals in the White
78. German Cement, CARTEL DAMAGE CLAims, http://www.carteldamageclaims.com/German%20Ce-

ment.shtml (last visited Jan. 2011).
79. Landgericht [LG] [Regional Court] Disseldorf, Feb. 21, 2007, Case No. 34 0 (Kart) 147/05 (F.R.G).

80. Oberlandesgericht IOLGI [Higher Regional Court] Diisseldorf May 14, 2008, Case VI U (Kart) 14/07;
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [German Federal Court of Justicel Apr. 7, 2009, Case KZR 42/08, Decision of 7
April 2009, Betriebs-Berater 2009, at 905.
81. The members of the European Hydrogen Peroxide Cartel were fined a total of C388 million, see Commission Decision Case COMP/F/C.38.620, 2006 O.J. (L353) 54.
http-//www.carteldamageclaims.com/
82. For more information, see CARTEL DAMAGE CLAIs,
LeniencyPlus+.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
83. Id.
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Paper may serve as model rules for the adoption of respective measures on national level.
However, the White Paper does not effectively address all existing obstacles for victims of
anticompetitive practices to bring damage actions. In many cases a collective approach is
required to successfully enforce antitrust damage claims.
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